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In all aspects of the law, proving that a defendant acted with a particular
mental state is messy. Direct evidence of the complex inner workings of the
mind is virtually nonexistent. Accordingly, litigants, juries, and judges often
must infer a mental state from external "markers, " such as circumstantial
evidence.
The search for mental markers is particularly messy in the area of securities
fraud litigation. To obtain remedies for violations of the federal securities
laws, victims typically must plead and prove that the perpetrators acted with
"scienter. " As variously defined by the Supreme Court, scienter is a mental
state that embraces an intent to deceive, but also includes some degree of
recklessness. To make matters more complicated, the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act requires victims of securities fraud to allege with
particularity facts that give rise to a "strong inference of scienter. " In Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 US. 308 (2007), the Supreme Court
interpreted this requirement, holding that a securities fraud complaint is viable
only if "a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and
at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts
alleged " Since Tellabs, the federal courts have been mired in threshold
litigation about the sufficiency of scienter allegations, often demanding an
unsuitable degree of particularity and reading Tellabs to invite a laborious
evidentiary weighing process at the initial pleading stage.
In this Article, we attempt to lend clarity and precision to one key aspect of this
judicial attempt to evaluate markers of scienter: the core operations inference.
We demonstrate that the federal courts should recognize that the inference of
scienter is strong where senior officers make misleading statements regarding
matters within their company 's core operations. An allegation that a senior
officer made a material misrepresentation about matters within the
organization 's core operations is a remarkably clear marker of intentional or
reckless behavior. We also show that the core operations inference is
consistent with the design of the federal securities laws, and with the Supreme
Court 's most recent securities fraud decisions, properly understood Equipped
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with the core operations inference, therefore, federal courts should be able to
resolve efficiently a significant part of litigation over the issue of scienter in
securities fraud cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Discovering and proving any mental state is messy. We cannot read minds,
so, without an admission, direct evidence of the complex inner workings of the
mind is virtually nonexistent. Accordingly, litigants, judges, and juries often
must infer a mental state from external mental "markers," or circumstantial
evidence.
The search for mental markers is particularly messy in the area of securities
fraud litigation, where a defendant's state of mind is paramount. Only
defendants who act with scienter-an intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud'--can be held liable under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
SErnst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 194 n.12 (1975).
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Act of 1934 and Rule 1 Ob-5, 2 the most potent of the antifraud remedies. And
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), plaintiffs
must allege with particularity "a strong inference" of scienter.3 In Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the Supreme Court interpreted this requirement,
holding that a securities fraud complaint is viable only if "a reasonable person
would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least compelling as any
opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged."'4 Since Tellabs, the
federal courts have been mired in threshold litigation about the particularity and
sufficiency of scienter allegations, often reading Tellabs to invite a laborious,
evidentiary weighing process at the initial pleading stage.
This Article tries to lend clarity and precision to one specific but critical
aspect of this judicial attempt to evaluate markers of scienter: inferring scienter
from misleading statements about the company's core operations. We
demonstrate that the federal courts should begin to recognize that the inference
of scienter is particularly strong where senior officers make misleading
statements regarding matters within their company's "core operations," even
without particularized allegations. Allegations that a senior officer made a
material misrepresentation about matters within the organization's core
operations are a remarkably clear marker of intentional or reckless behavior.
We also show that the core operations inference is consistent with the design of
the federal securities laws and with the Supreme Court's most recent securities
fraud decisions, properly understood. Equipped with the core operations
inference, therefore, federal courts should be able to efficiently resolve a
significant part of litigation over the issue of scienter in securities fraud cases.
Judicial recognition of the core operations inference takes on renewed
significance after Tellabs because the doctrine prevents district judges from
abusing their newfound discretion in weighing inferences and discounting
culpable ones. In Tellabs, the Supreme Court held that a securities fraud
complaint should survive dismissal if "a reasonable person would deem the
inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing
inference one could draw from the facts alleged."' 5 And, according to the Court,
2Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 1Ob-5 prohibit any
company or person from making any untrue statement of a material fact or from omitting a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17
C.F.R. § lOb-5(b) (2011).
3 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). The other elements of a securities fraud claim under Section
10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 include: (1) that the defendant made a material misrepresentation or
omission (materiality), (2) that the material misrepresentation or omission was made in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security (in connection with), (3) that the plaintiff
relied on the material misrepresentation (reliance), (4) that the plaintiff suffered an economic
loss as a result (economic loss), and (5) that the material misrepresentation actually caused
the loss (loss causation). See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42
(2005).
4551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
5Id.
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to determine whether the inference is strong, district judges should weigh
plausible culpable and nonculpable inferences. 6 But this weighing implicitly
leaves district judges considerable discretion to determine which inferences are
reasonable, which inferences to discount, and how the strength of any given
inference compares to another. The problem is that district judges might
discount allegations of scienter as less likely than virtually any other
nonculpable mental state, including negligence, ignorance, and even
indifference. 7
Without judicial recognition of the core operations inference, courts may
discount circumstantial allegations that would amount to recklessness, or worse,
twist the fact that the allegation concerns the core operations of the company
against plaintiffs. Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharmaceuticals Inc.8 is such an
example. There, the plaintiffs alleged that Inspire, a manufacturer of an
experimental drug (and "one of the company's flagship products") to treat dry-
eye disease, misstated the results of its clinical trials. The Fourth Circuit held
that the plaintiffs did not allege a strong inference of scienter because the drug
involved in the misstatements was so essential to the company's success that
"[i]t is improbable that Inspire would stake its existence on a drug and a clinical
trial that the company thought was doomed to failure. Plaintiffs' inference of
fraud.., is thus not even plausible, much less convincing."9 But, as this Article
shows, the core operations inference is plausible and convincing. 10
Part II of this Article revisits the PSLRA's dual-pleading requirement that
plaintiffs must plead both (1) facts, including those concerning a defendant's
state of mind, with particularity; and (2) a strong inference of scienter. Part III
explains that a proper understanding of the core operations inference means that
if senior management makes misleading statements pertaining to facts that are
material to investors, then the inference that the defendant acted recklessly is
6 Id
7 See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Judicial Access Barriers to
Remedies for Securities Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 56-58 (2012). We do not
mean to suggest that the application of Tellabs always results in a judgment against
plaintiffs. Some examples of the opposite result are discussed in this Article. See, e.g., N.M.
State Inv. Council v. Ernst & Young LLP, 641 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2011); Schleicher
v. Wendt, 529 F. Supp. 2d 959, 961 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
8549 F.3d 618 (4th Cir. 2008).
9 1d. at 627.
10 Although the doctrine is helpful to plaintiffs, elsewhere we have questioned whether
the doctrine could be used offensively to trigger the statute of limitations. See Michael J.
Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Toward a Just Measure of Repose: The Statute of
Limitations in Securities Fraud, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1547, 1579-81 (2011). Moreover,
adopting the core operations inference may just shift the dispute from whether the facts
suggest scienter to whether the facts actually relate to the company's core operations. See,
e.g., In re eSpeed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 266, 294 n.210 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(collecting cases that declined to apply the core operations inference when the plaintiffs did
not sufficiently allege facts suggesting that alleged fraud was at the core of the company's
operations).
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cogent and compelling, even absent particularized allegations. Part IV shows
that the federal courts have attempted to accommodate the core operations
inference by adopting a sliding-scale approach: the more material the
misrepresentation, then the more likely a court will infer scienter absent
particularized allegations of knowledge.
Part V argues that the Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed the core
operations inference. To show that the Court has endorsed this inference, this
Article attempts to refine the doctrine and harmonize the seemingly conflicting
treatment of the core operations inference among the federal appellate courts.
Part V begins by showing that the inference is not inconsistent with Court
precedent, even when the Court is restricting the scope of liability under Rule
1Ob-5. In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders" and
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,12 the Court
recognized that, although defendants have no affirmative duty to speak, when
someone makes a publicly misleading statement, he can be held liable under
Rule lOb-5. Second, Part V shows that in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds13 and
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,14 the Court acknowledged that a strong
inference of scienter exists where a defendant makes a misleading statement
about facts that are so material to the company and investors such that it would
be absurd to suggest that the defendant did not know about them. And last, in
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,15 the Court softened the PSLRA's
particularity requirement to a single factor in a holistic scienter analysis so that
the lack of particularized allegations will not defeat an inference of scienter,
even one generated by the core operations inference. Part VI concludes that
judicial recognition of the core operations inference should help injured
investors with merited claims survive a motion to dismiss.
II. CONGRESS AND THE PSLRA
In 1995, Congress perceived that the litigation and settlement of a securities
fraud claim became unmoored from the merits. 16 To curb what Congress
perceived as abusive filings, Congress enacted the PSLRA, which demanded
that plaintiffs plead with particularity a strong inference that the defendant acted
"1 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 (2011).
12 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
13 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010).
14131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2011).
15551 U.S. 308, 326 (2007).
16 The premise underlying the PSLRA-that the merits of a claim do not matter when a
company determines whether to settle-has been thoroughly critiqued. See, e.g., Joel
Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest's "Disimplifying
Private Rights ofAction Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority,"
108 HARV. L. REv. 438, 444-49 (1994); Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the
Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in
Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2080-84 (1995).
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with scienter. 17 The PSLRA's pleading requirement has two components:
(1) that the plaintiff alleges facts with particularity; and (2) that the plaintiff
alleges a strong inference of scienter, also with particularity. 18 The federal
appellate courts have long treated these as distinct. 19 Both components address
the plaintiff's pleading burden, but in different and significant respects.
A. Pleading Securities Fraud with Particularity
The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to allege with particularity the defendant's
state of mind and each statement alleged to have been misleading, why it is
misleading, and if made on information and belief, all facts on which that belief
is formed.20 The particularity requirement embodies Congress's judgment that
Rule 9(b) governs securities fraud claims. 21 But unlike Rule 9(b), which allows
plaintiffs to allege a mental state generally, under the PSLRA, plaintiffs must
allege the defendant's mental state with particularity. 22 The PSLRA requires
plaintiffs to allege the "who, what, where, why, and when" surrounding the
fraud and the defendant's state of mind.23
The particularity requirement serves three purposes: first, it is believed that
particularized allegations make the truth of these allegations more probable.24
Second, to allege facts with the requisite detail, plaintiffs must undertake
17S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694; see
also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2) (2006).
18 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2). Professor Michael Perino observes that the PSLRA has
three distinct requirements: (1) specificity; (2) particularity; and (3) a strong inference.
Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 ILL. L.
REv. 913, 925.
19See, e.g., La. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 622 F.3d 471, 478 (6th
Cir. 2010); In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1546 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc);
Holmes v. Baker, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
20 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2).
21See, e.g., Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir.
2009); Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1165 (9th Cir. 2009); Miss. Pub.
Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 523 F.3d 75, 85 n.5 (1st Cir. 2008); Cent. Laborer's
Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 550 (5th Cir. 2007).
22 Compare FED. R. Clv. P. 9(b), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). See also Zucco Partners,
LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009); Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc.,
544 F.3d 1230, 1237-38 (1 1th Cir. 2008). Originally, securities fraud cases were assessed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which governed all civil allegations of fraud.
See, e.g., Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993).
2 3 See, e.g., Institutional Investors Grp., 564 F.3d at 253 (explaining the particularity
requirement under the PSLRA); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (2d Cir. 1990)
(explaining the particularity requirement under Rule 9(b)).
24 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 507, 516. There is
some reason to be skeptical of this claim, however, as Professor Reinert has found that
traditional notice pleading is no better than heightened (or "plausibility") pleading in
separating the wheat from the chaff. Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened
Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119,125-26, 159 (2011).
[Vol. 73:3
INFERRING SCIENTER FROM CORE OPERATIONS
adequate investigation to verify the soundness of their claim before filing a
complaint. This is no easy task as discovery is stayed in securities litigation
pending any motion to dismiss. 25 Thus, the particularity requirement encourages
investors to be diligent in protecting against fraud. 26 Third, particularized
pleading ensures that plaintiffs seek redress for a known wrong rather than use a
lawsuit as pretext to discover an unknown wrong.27 Ergo, the particularity
requirement protects defendants from unnecessary harm to their reputation and,
for public firms, protects them from unnecessary harm to their stock price. The
federal appellate courts do not hesitate to dismiss a securities fraud complaint
that does not allege facts with the requisite particularity.28
B. Pleading a Strong Inference of Scienter and Recklessness
The PSLRA also requires plaintiffs to allege a "strong inference" of
scienter.29 This requirement serves one of the aims of the securities laws and the
antifraud remedies: deterrence. 30 Optimal deterrence is probably best achieved
by influencing the incentives of culpable persons and firms, i.e., those who act
with scienter. To that end, the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to allege "a strong
inference" of scienter,31 the culpable mental state of the defendant.
First, we turn to the "strong inference." To discuss a "strong inference," we
need to define it, which is no easy task. A "strong inference" is a messy, vague
concept. To start, an "inference" is a conclusion reached by considering other
facts and deducing a logical conclusion from those facts. 32 Next, this inference
must be "strong." The Supreme Court in Tellabs tried to provide guidance on
when an inference will be "strong": The facts alleged when taken as true and
assessed collectively generate an inference that the defendant acted with
25 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3).
26See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 10, at 1591-93 (stating that marshaling
allegations sufficient to meet the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirement takes time, and
thus plaintiffs are prompted to investigate early).2 7 When Congress implemented the stay of discovery in the PSLRA, Congress
specifically sought to discourage the practice of filing a lawsuit and then using discovery to
uncover a sustainable claim. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693.
2 8 See 5 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON
SECURITIEs FRAUD & COMMODITIEs FRAUD § 10:83 (2d ed. 2010) (collecting cases).
29 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
30 For a discussion of the securities laws' goal of deterrence and a proposal for
improvement, see Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring
the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule lOb-5, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1301, 1307-25 (2008). Recent scholarship on the effects of SEC and class action
enforcement of the securities laws finds that these mechanisms significantly deter aggressive
financial reporting behavior. See generally Jared Jennings et al., The Deterrent Effects of
SEC Enforcement and Class Action Litigation (Dec. 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1868578.
3115 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
3 2 BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY 666 (9th ed. 2009).
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scienter that is at least as likely as an inference that the defendant did not.33 Yet
weighing inferences is difficult, and the strength of any one inference is likely
in the eye of the beholder.34
Second, we must define "scienter." "Scienter" embraces intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud. 35 According to every federal court of appeals, "intent"
encompasses some form of recklessness as well. 36 Recklessness is defined as:
[A] highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that
is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it.3
7
Although the federal appellate courts have couched their recklessness
standards differently (i.e., "deliberate recklessness," 38  "conscious
recklessness," 39  "severe recklessness," 40  "extreme recklessness," 41  or
33 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322-24 (2007).
34 See John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The
Weighing Game, 39 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 613, 649-51 (2008); see also Devona L. Wells, Case
Note, Why Plaintiffs Should Learn to Love the Strong-Inference Standard for Pleading a
Securities Fraud Claim-Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1364, 1381 (2010) ("Tellabs reinforced the deference given to a judge's subjective views on
the severity of wrongdoing in fraud cases and did not, therefore, materially change the way
judges handle securities fraud cases.").
35 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1975).
36 Before the PSLRA, the circuits recognized that recklessness was sufficient to trigger
liability. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979); Nelson v.
Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 251
(7th Cir. 1977); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977). After
the PSLRA and Tellabs, the circuits still recognized that recklessness is sufficient to trigger
liability under Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret.
Sys. v. Waters Corp., 632 F.3d 751, 757 (1st Cir. 2011); Dronsejko v. Thornton, 632 F.3d
658, 665 (10th Cir. 2011); La. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 622 F.3d 471,
479 (6th Cir. 2010); Detroit Gen. Ret. Sys. v. Medtronic, Inc., 621 F.3d 800, 808 (8th Cir.
2010); Edward J. Goodman Life Income Trust v. Jabil Circuit, Inc., 594 F.3d 783, 790 (11 th
Cir. 2010); Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d 1167, 1180 (9th Cir. 2009),
affid, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011); Liberty Prop. Trust v. Republic Props. Corp., 577 F.3d 335,
342 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172,
181 (4th Cir. 2009); S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir.
2009); Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 251 (5th Cir. 2009); Institutional
Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 2009); Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521
F.3d 686, 693 (7th Cir. 2008).
3 7 Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045-47 (7th Cir. 1977); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). The line between negligence,
recklessness, and intent is not always clear, however. See generally Geoffrey Christopher
Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 111 (2008).
38 See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999).
39 See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 2000).
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"conscious disregard" 42), Professor Ann Morales Olazdbal shows that the
application among the circuit courts of appeals tends to converge on whether
the defendant's misstatements or omissions are an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care presenting a danger of misleading investors that is
either known to the defendant or so obvious that the actor must have been aware
of it.43 Thus, under one prong, the objective obviousness of the danger of
misleading statements is alone sufficient to infer scienter, even if the defendant
does not actually appreciate that risk.44 The federal appellate courts have long
accepted this standard for the state of mind required for liability,45 and in fact
several standard jury instructions have embraced enabling the factfinder to infer
the defendant's scienter from the objective obviousness of the danger of
misleading statements. 46
The Supreme Court has explicitly left open the question whether
recklessness suffices to meet the scienter requirement of Rule 1Ob-5, but the
Court has not suggested restiveness with the conclusion that some form of
recklessness is enough.47 The conclusion that recklessness is sufficient to
4 0 See, e.g., Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir.
2003); Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2001); Bryant v. Avado
Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999).
41 See, e.g., Howard v. SEC, 376 F.3d 1136, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
4 2 See, e.g., In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999).
4 3 Ann Morales Olazdibal, Defining Recklessness: A Doctrinal Approach to Deterrence
of Secondary Market Securities Fraud, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 1415, 1424-25 [hereinafter
Morales Olazibal, Defining Recklessness]; Ann Morales Olazibal, The Search for "Middle
Ground": Towards a Harmonized Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act's New Pleading Standard, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 153, 162-64 (2001).44 Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045-47 (7th Cir. 1977).
45 See, e.g., In re Level 3 Commc'ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 667 F.3d 1331, 1343 n.12 (10th
Cir. 2012); Findwhat Investors Grp. v. Findwhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1300 (11 th Cir. 2011);
Amacker v. Renaissance Asset Mgmt. LLC, 657 F.3d 252, 257-58 (5th Cir. 2011) (defining
recklessness in the context of aiding and abetting violations); Miss. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v.
Bos. Scientific Corp., 649 F.3d 5, 20 (1st Cir. 2011); Dronsejko v. Thornton, 632 F.3d 658,
665 (10th Cir. 2011); Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d 1167, 1180 (9th Cir.
2009), affd, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011); Horizon Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. H & R Block, Inc., 580
F.3d 755, 766 (8th Cir. 2009).46 3B KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS: CWIL
§§ 162.232, .284 (5th ed. 2012); see also PAT-FERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE 5TH
CIRCUIT § 7.1 (2009); MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT
COURT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT: CIVIL § 18.3 (2007).
This is not to suggest that defendants cannot try to convince a jury that, despite the
objective obviousness of the facts that they misrepresented, they nonetheless harbored a pure
heart. See Allan Horwich, An Inquiry into the Perception of Materiality as an Element of
Scienter Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 67 Bus. LAW. 1 (2011). The point is that a reasonable jury
is permitted to infer an intent to deceive or recklessness from mere objective evidence of the
materiality of the facts misrepresented.47 See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323-24 (2011);
Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1796 (2010); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
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impose liability for fraud is likewise consistent with the English common law
and the majority of American common law on fraud.48 In sum, what scienter
boils down to is that the plaintiff must allege and prove, at a minimum, that the
defendant knowingly made a misleading statement or was reckless in
disregarding a substantial risk that a statement was misleading.49
III. THE CORE OPERATIONS INFERENCE OF SCIENTER: PLEADING
.RECKLESSNESS THROUGH MATERIALITY
Defining a culpable state of mind is one thing, but pleading and proving it is
another matter entirely.50 Conclusory allegations that the defendant acted with
the requisite mental state will not suffice.51 And direct evidence of a person's
state of mind is rare because this evidence is usually limited to an actual
admission by the defendant under oath or the testimony of a witness based upon
personal knowledge, both of which are unlikely to be available without
discovery,52 which is stayed in securities litigation pending any motion to
dismiss.53 Thus, plaintiffs are often forced to rely on mental markers
(circumstantial evidence) to allege a defendant's state of mind.54
Rights, Ltd., 551,U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007);.Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194
n.12 (1976).
1 4 8 See Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions
Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CN. L. REV. 667, 696-
706 (1991); William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 34 HOus. L. REV. 121, 166-71 (1997).
4 9 See, e.g., Makor Issues'& Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc. (Tellabs I1), 513 F.3d 702, 704
(7th Cir. 2008); Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 2007).5 0
"What passes in the mind of man is not scrutable by any human tribunal; it is only to
be collected from his acts." R v. Shipley, (1784) 99 Eng. Rep. 774, 828 (K.B.).
51 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
52 4 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 29:1 (7th ed.
2011). The Second. Circuit has recognized the difficulty for plaintiffs in pleading scienter
without "specifically greedy comments from.., authorized corporate individual[s]." Press
v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
53 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) (2006).
54 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30 (1983). One set of
allegations that may circumstantially suggest scienter in the Second Circuit, for example, is
that the defendants had both a motive and an opportunity to commit fraud. See, e.g., ECA &
Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187, 198-99
(2d Cir. 2009); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531
F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008).
For securities fraud claims, an added difficulty is locating where corporate scienter
resides. The "meaning of scienter in the corporate environment" is "one of the great
unexplored issues under Rule lob-5." Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of
Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases, and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK.
L. REV. 629, 660 n.91 (1997). Generally, plaintiffs plead the scienter of a corporation by
alleging that the person responsible for the misstatement or omission possessed the requisite
state of mind. See Bruce D. Angioli.llo, Establishing Scienter in Securities Fraud Actions
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One of the mental markers plaintiffs often rely upon is the core operations
inference. Under the core operations inference, plaintiffs allege that the subject
of the fraud concerned a "core operation" of the company and thus the
company's senior management, by virtue of their positions, either knew what
they were saying was misleading or acted recklessly in not knowing what they
were saying was misleading and speaking about it anyway. In other words,
senior management is charged with knowledge about facts that are so material
to the company and its investors, and when management speaks about these
matters, they should ensure that they do so truthfully. This Part examines what
constitutes a "core operation" and who is charged with knowledge of these core
operations. This Part explains that the core operations inference recognizes a
strong likelihood of scienter when misstatements concern matters material to
the company, and it is senior management-who should be familiar with these
matters-making these misleading statements.
A. What Is a "Core Operation"?
A "core operation" is a fact that is material to the company's operations and
its bottom line, and as such it is something that is material to investors as well.
55
Under the securities laws, a fact is material if "there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important" in making the
investment decision. 56 Generally, a core operation is thought of as the firm's
primary product or service; as Judge Richard Posner put it, a core operation is
like what "Windows XP and Vista are to Microsoft. '57 Yet core operations
encompass much more than just the company's core products or services.
Courts have recognized that the core operations inference extends to any matter
of importance that might affect the company in a significant way, including, as
Through Imputation of Knowledge, in 42ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION
325, 344 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1850, 2010). Plaintiffs
may invoke the collective scienter theory, which allows plaintiffs to attribute scienter to the
corporation without identifying a single actor who intentionally misspoke. In others words,
the theory permits the aggregation in a single pleading of one person's misstatement with the
intent of another person in order to attribute an allegation of scienter to the corporation. See
generally Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales OlazAbal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 81, 86.
5 5 See, e.g., Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 181 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) ("[M]aterial misrepresentations include those 'concem[ing] a segment or other portion
of the registrant's business that has been identified as playing a significant role in the
registrant's operations or profitability."' (emphasis omitted) (quoting SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,152 (Aug. 19, 1999))).56 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).57 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc. (Tellabs I/), 513 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir.
2008).
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just one example, important transactions. 58 Viewing core operations as anything
material to investors explains why the doctrine is invoked (though
unsuccessfully at times) in cases involving accounting irregularities, which may
not be the core products of the company, but nevertheless are so critical to the
company's daily operations that one can expect management to be aware of
them.59 Thus, at the most general level, the core operations inference recognizes
that senior management is aware of facts that are material to the company, or at
least considers these officers reckless if they ignorantly speak about these
material facts.
If the core operations inference is understood as a common sense notion
that senior management is or should be aware of facts material to the company
and investors, then the inference is really nothing extraordinary. The federal
courts have long recognized scienter's relationship to materiality. 60 Two cases
help illustrate this point. First, consider Cosmas v. Hassett,61 which predates
both Tellabs and the PSLRA. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged the company's
chief executive officer touted the company's sales to the People's Republic of
China as an important new source of revenue and predicted increasing sales and
per share earnings for the coming year.62 Before these announcements,
however, the People's Republic of China imposed import restrictions that made
58 See, e.g., Jones v. Corus Bankshares, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1028 (N.D. I11.
2010) (stating that the core operations inference extends to important transactions that would
affect the company's performance); In re Huffy Corp. Sec. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1000
(S.D. Ohio 2008) (same); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Sec. Litig., 291 F. Supp. 2d 722, 727
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (same).
59 See Schultz v. Applica Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
(collecting cases). But see Ley v. Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801, 812 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating
that knowledge of "obvious" accounting irregularities would not be imputed to executives
because change in revenue caused by irregularities was too low); Ind. Elec. Workers'
Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 835-36, 839-40 (5th Cir. 2008)
(refusing to infer "hands on" management knew of accounting irregularities with a value of
"hundreds of millions of dollars").
60 See, e.g., City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Waters Corp.,
632 F.3d 751, 757 (1st Cir. 2011) ("If it is questionable whether a fact is material or its
materiality is marginal, that tends to undercut the argument that defendants acted with the
[scienter]." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); City of Phila. v. Fleming
Co., 264 F.3d 1245, 1265 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[W]hether Defendants recklessly failed to
disclose [a fact] is ... intimately bound up with whether Defendants either actually knew or
recklessly ignored that the [fact] was material and nevertheless failed to disclose it.");
Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309
(2011) (No. 09-1156) (Scalia, J.) (stating that there really is no difference between scienter
and materiality); see also Michael J. Kaufman, Living in a Material World: Strict Liability
Under Rule 10b-5, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990) (arguing scienter is actually bound up
with materiality); Michael J. Kaufman, The Uniform Rule of Liability Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Judicial Creation of a Comprehensive Scheme of Investor Insurance,
63 TEMP. L. REv. 61, 62 (1990) (same).
61 886 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1989).
62 1d. at 10.
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these predicted sales improbable. 63 The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs
adequately alleged a strong inference of scienter because the allegations
concerned a "significant source of income for the company." 64 The misleading
statements from the company's CEO about facts so material to the company
were enough for the court to infer scienter.65
Second, consider Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc.,66 a case that predates Tellabs
but comes after the PSLRA. In Nathenson, the plaintiffs alleged that the
president (who was also CEO and a director) of a biopharmaceutical company
falsely represented that the company received patent approval for Vasomax, the
company's potential drug.67 The company claimed in press releases that it
received approval for a "method of use" patent that "broadly covered" items
dissolved in the mouth; but in fact, Vasomax was to be dissolved in the
stomach, and thus the patent did not cover it.68 The Fifth Circuit said these
allegations were sufficient to generate a strong inference that the officer acted
with scienter based on his positions (he was president, CEO, and a director).69 It
would have been absurd to suggest the defendant was unaware of the lack of
patent approval for Vasomax because the company "was essentially a one
product company, and that product was Vasomax"; that "substantially all of the
Company's efforts and expenditures over the next few years [were] devoted to
Vasomax"; and that the president acknowledged that the approval of the patent
was a "crucial event" for the company. 70
B. Who Should Have Knowledge of Core Operations?
The inference recognizes that senior management (including officers and
directors) likely have knowledge of the company's core operations. Presuming
senior management's knowledge of core operations-or facts that are material
to the company-is consistent with common sense, the common law, and the
securities laws.
First, as a matter of common sense, we would expect senior management to
be familiar with the company he or she is charged with running. The Sixth
63 Id
641d. at 13; see also In re Atlas Worldwide Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 324 F. Supp. 2d
474, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).65 Cosmas, 886 F.2d at 10-13; see also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d
1124, 1130-31 (2d Cir. 1994) (interpreting Cosmas).
66267 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001).
67 Id. at 405-06.
68 1d. at 423, 425.
69 Id. at 424-25.
701d. In In re Ancor Communications, Inc., Securities Litigation, 22 F. Supp. 2d 999
(D. Minn. 1998), also a pre-Tellabs case, the court inferred that key officers of the company
must have known the company's product would be incompatible with the product of another
company with whom the defendant had entered into a supply contract because the supply
contract "was undeniably the most significant contract in [the defendant's] history." Id. at
1005.
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Circuit made this point in Frank v. Dana Corp., where the plaintiffs alleged that
two top executives of an automobile parts manufacturer misled the public about
the company's ability to prosper at a time when (1) the entire auto industry was
spiraling toward bankruptcy; (2) one of the company's "key product lines" was
operating at 50% of earnings; (3) multiple factories failed to meet their budgets;
and (4) the price of steel rose 75%.71 The Sixth Circuit recognized that "[i]t is
difficult to grasp the thought that [the two executives] really had no idea that
[the company] was on the road to bankruptcy. '72
One would expect senior management to be familiar with the company's
core operations. Otherwise, the market would discredit their public statements.
As Professor Geoffrey P. Miller illustrates when explaining why allegations of
materiality further increase the probability that a defendant acted with scienter:
[S]ophisticated businesspeople understand that when information is material-
when it is important to market actors in deciding whether to buy, sell, or hold
the company's shares-they need to be especially careful to verify the truth of
what they are saying, both for legal reasons (materiality being a predicate for
liability under Rule 1Ob-5) and also for business purposes (the market will lose
faith in the company if its officers make false statements about important
facts).73
Apart from common sense, the law provides a basis for the inference as
well. At common law, officers and directors owe fiduciary duties to the
corporations they serve.74 These parties cannot carry out their owed duties of
loyalty, good faith, and honesty without being cognizant of the company's core
operations. 75 Thus, directors and officers, though not required to know every
71646 F.3d 954, 961-62 (6th Cir. 2011).
721d. at 962.
73 Miller, supra note 24, at 517.
74 See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85 (1943) (explicitly rejecting a "lax
view of fiduciary obligations" that officers owe to a holding company in the process of
reorganization); see also 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1460 (2011) (collecting cases).
We clarify that by emphasizing duty's relationship to scienter, we do not suggest that
securities fraud liability would be limited to only those who owe fiduciary duties to
investors. We only suggest that an inference of scienter is more likely when those with a
duty to know about the company's workings make misleading statements concerning those
operations.
75 See, e.g., In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 284 F.3d 216, 231 (1st Cir. 2002)
(recognizing that under Massachusetts law directors have a duty of reasonable supervision).
A claim brought under In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d
959 (Del. Ch. 1996), permits officers and directors to be held liable for their inaction or
ignorance of liability-creating activities within the corporation. "Caremark duties are
breached when fiduciaries either fail to implement any reporting or information system or
controls or, having implemented [these] controls, consciously fail to oversee their operation,
thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their
attention." In re Brocade Commc'ns Sys., Inc. Derivative Litig., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1048
(N.D. Cal. 2009).
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nook and cranny of corporate doings, have a duty to familiarize themselves with
at least the company's core operations.
76
Additionally, under the securities laws both the fraud-on-the-market theory
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) support inferring that senior
management has or should have knowledge about the company's core
operations. 77 To begin, as Professor Morales Olazibal recognizes, "[W]hen top
corporate officers misspeak to the marketplace about material matters, harm to
investors is not only possible, but likely." 78 Public misstatements about material
facts made on an efficient market are presumed to have an effect on the stock
price; this is the essence of the fraud-on-the-market theory and the underlying
efficient market hypothesis, which the Supreme Court has endorsed most
recently in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. 7 9
In addition, SOX's requirements that executives certify financial reports
support the idea that senior management should be held accountable to investors
for misleading statements concerning core operations.80 SOX requires the
principal executive officer and principal financial officer to certify that they
have reviewed the quarterly Form 1O-Q and annual Form 10-K reports and that
these reports do not contain any untrue statement or material omission.81 This
provision is not unreasonable--"Would anybody buy a company's stock if they
76 See Stratte-McClure v. Stanley, 784 F. Supp. 2d 373, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
77 Robert B. Thompson and Professor Hillary A. Sale persuasively show that the
"federal securities law and enforcement via securities fraud class actions today have become
the most visible means of regulating corporate governance." Robert B. Thompson & Hillary
A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56
VAND. L. REv. 859, 860 (2003).
As additional evidence that senior management is presumed to have knowledge of core
operations under the securities laws, consider Section 16(b). Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act
requires statutory insiders-officers, directors, and shareholders with more than a 10%
interest in the issuing company-to disgorge profits from short-swing trading. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (2006). This disgorgement rule is premised on the idea that these statutory insiders
are "presumed to have access to inside information." Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident
Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 243 (1976) (emphasis added).
78 Morales Olazdbal, Defining Recklessness, supra note 43, at 1428. Professor Hillary
A. Sale argues even further that the new "publicness" of companies means that executives
and officers must address expectations not only of its shareholders, but also of "Main Street"
in general about what a company can and will do. See generally Hillary A. Sale, The New
"Public" Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2011).
79 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184-85 (2011); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
246-47 (1988).
8o S. REP. No. 107-205, at 23 (2002) ("[SOX] requires CEOs and CFOs to certify their
companies' financial reports, outlaws fraud and deception by managers in the auditing
process, prevents CEOs and CFOs from benefitting from profits they receive as a result of
misstatements of their company's financials, and facilitates the imposition of judicial bars
against officers and directors who have violated the securities laws."); see also Morales
Olazdbal, Defining Recklessness, supra note 43, at 1447-48.
81 15 U.S.C. § 7241; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2011).
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knew its officers could not make such a statement?" 82 Indeed, as the Ninth
Circuit observed, an officer's signature is "rendered meaningless unless the
officer believes that the statements in the document are true." 83
8 2 Charles W. Murdock, Why Not Tell the Truth?: Deceptive Practices and the
Economic Meltdown, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 801, 836 (2010). Professor Murdock makes a
compelling case for the reasonableness of the SOX's certification requirement:
[To assess how reasonable or unreasonable the provisions of Section 302 are, it might
be helpful to look at the regulations promulgated pursuant to Section 302, which set
forth the certification that the officers are required to give. But rather than look at the
certification itself, let's look at its negative. In other words, what would the antithesis of
the required certification look like? I suggest it might look something like this:
1, [identify the certifying individual], certify that:
1. I have [not] reviewed this [specify report] of [identify registrant];
2. Based on my knowledge, this report [may] does -e contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, [may or may not; I really don't know] fairly
present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and
cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are [not] responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial
reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the
registrant and have:
a. [Not] Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
b. [Not] Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused
such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our
supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of
financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external
purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;
c. [Not] Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and [we have no] presented in this rept . conclusions about
the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of
the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
d. [Not] Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):
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SOX also imposes duties on certifying officers to: (1) establish and
maintain internal controls that are designed to ensure that material information
is made known to officers; and (2) disclose to the audit committee any
deficiencies in the internal-control design and any fraud involving an officer or
employee who has a significant role related to the company's internal
controls.84 Any executive who willfully certifies a periodic financial statement
knowing that the report contains misleading statements is subject to twenty
years imprisonment and a fine of up to $5 million.85 Although most federal
courts state that false SOX certifications alone do not create a strong inference
of scienter,86 courts nevertheless use SOX certification as justification to require
management to familiarize themselves with the facts relevant to the company's
financial statement before signing documents filed with the SEC. 87
The defendant's role is necessary to assess whether the defendant should
have known or inquired about certain facts. Indeed, before the Supreme Court
announced in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder that negligence was not sufficient to
impose liability under Rule lOb-5, some federal courts adopted a "flexible duty"
standard to determine whether and to what extent scienter was required.8 8 Even
after Hochfelder, the flexible-duty approach reappears in the guise of
a. [We have no idea whether there are] All significant deficiencies and
material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and
b. [We have no idea whether there has been] Any fraud, whether or not
material, that involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.
If management of a company filed the foregoing certification, would anyone buy
stock in such a company? Why then cannot corporate management assert the positive,
since the negative is unacceptable?
Charles W. Murdock, Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Hero or Villain, 39 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 525, 540-42 (2008) (alterations in original) (emphases omitted).83 Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000).
84 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4)-(5).
85 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(1)-(2).
86 See, e.g., Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1103-04 (9th Cir.
2009); In re Ceridian Corp. Sec. Litig., 542 F.3d 240, 248 (8th Cir. 2008); Ind. Elec.
Workers' Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 545 (5th Cir. 2008);
Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1266 (1 1th Cir. 2006).87 See, e.g., In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 433, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In
re Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 324 F. Supp. 2d 474, 491 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
Although SOX explicitly does not provide for any private right of action, under tort law,
a statute may yet impose an affirmative duty. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 38 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 286 (1965).88 See generally White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974), overruled by Hollinger
v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1570 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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determining whether one's conduct was reckless. 89 The core operations
inference recognizes that senior management stand as both fiduciaries and as
officers of publicly held companies, and thus they appreciate the economic
harm that would flow from public misstatements about material facts.
Focusing on the defendant's role does not reintroduce liability under Rule
1Ob-5 for breach of fiduciary duty or mere negligence, which the Supreme
Court has rejected in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green9" and Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,91 respectively. Scienter premised on the core operations inference
is predicated on facts that are so material that to suggest that the company's
management was unaware of them or to excuse management from knowing
about them would be absurd.
Persons responsible for staying abreast of these kinds of facts (the
company's core operations) likely include persons other than just the
company's principal officers. The company's directors should also have
knowledge of core operations. In a case decided by the Ninth Circuit after the
PSLRA, No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v.
America West Holding Corp., the plaintiffs alleged no particular facts to show
that the company's outside directors knew about maintenance problems at the
company or about the government's investigation of those problems.92 In place
of particularized allegations, the plaintiffs relied on an inference based on the
directors' positions on the company's board: The plaintiffs argued-and the
Ninth Circuit agreed-that the company's maintenance problems and the
government's investigation into them were so important to the company that it
was "absurd to suggest that the Board of Directors would not discuss" them.93
In sum, by assuming senior management, by virtue of their positions, were
or should have been aware of facts so material to the company's core
operations, the core operations inference enables plaintiffs to plead recklessness
without particularized allegations of their mental state. The core operations
inference represents the quotidian notion that it is likely that senior management
charged with knowing facts material to the company's core operations do in fact
know these facts, and that they would not make misleading statements about
them if cognizant that doing so would cause investors harm. The inference thus
premises scienter on two concepts: materiality and duty.
89 3B HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 13:22 (2d ed. 2011). The drafters of the American Law Institute's
Federal Securities Code likewise recognized that the meaning of recklessness depends to
some extent on the particular defendant's role or position. FED. SEC. CODE § 202(86) cmt.
8(d) (1980).
90430 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1977).
91425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
92 320 F.3d 920, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2003).
931d. at 943 n.21; see also Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1989) (imputing
knowledge to entire board of directors under the core operations inference). But see In re
Forest Labs., Inc. Derivative Litig., 450 F. Supp. 2d 379, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that
"there [was] no authority to support the attribution of knowledge to Outside Directors who
[were] not alleged to be directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the company").
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C. A Note About the Core Operations Inference, Summary Judgment, and
Trial
At this point, we specifically address the viability of the core operations
inference at summary judgment and trial, and we suggest that the inference is a
viable method for overcoming summary judgment motions and meeting the
plaintiff's burden at trial because the inference is just that-an inference drawn
from circumstantial evidence. Thus, so long as the plaintiff offers evidence from
which a reasonable trier of fact could find the facts supporting the core
operations inference, then the plaintiff has offered sufficient circumstantial
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find scienter.
We have been unable to locate any reported decisions that directly address
the scope or viability of the core operations inference on summary judgment or
trial. On the one hand, the higher standard at summary judgment and trial
suggests that the core operations inference may be insufficient. Tellabs stated
that the burden at the motion-to-dismiss stage is less than the burden plaintiffs
are faced with at trial:
A plaintiff alleging fraud in a § 10(b) action.., must plead facts rendering an
inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing inference. At
trial, she must then prove her case by a "preponderance of the evidence."
Stated otherwise, she must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the
defendant acted with scienter. 94
One might conclude that to the extent the core operations inference suggests
that it is only at least as likely that the defendant acted with scienter, then the
inference alone may not be sufficient at summary judgment or trial.
But should the plaintiff prove at trial or offer evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the facts underlying the inference-that senior
management made misleading statements about facts pertaining to the
company's core operations-this would provide circumstantial evidence of
scienter that is sufficient to overcome summary judgment and to satisfy the
burden at trial. The Supreme Court has recognized that circumstantial evidence
alone is "more than sufficient" to prove scienter.95
Consider In re NeoPharm, Inc. Securities Litigation, where the court held
that a reasonable jury could find scienter from the plaintiffs evidence that the
defendant, a pharmaceutical company, and its senior management, made false
and misleading statements about development delays for its "lead product in
development" that was "a potentially revolutionary method of administering
94Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328-29 (2007)
(emphases omitted); 'cf Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000)
("Because the PSLRA did not alter the substantive requirements for scienter under § 10(b),
however, the standard on summaryjudgrent... remains unaltered ....").95lHerman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390-91 n.30 (1983).
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[an] anti-cancer drug." 96 The court did not mention the core operations
inference, but still, this was the only evidence of scienter that the court
discussed, implicitly supporting the notion that the core operations inference is
sufficient at summary judgment and trial.
IV. THE CURRENT SLIDING-SCALE APPROACH TO THE CORE OPERATIONS
INFERENCE
We now turn to the federal courts' sliding scale for the core operations
inference. The sliding-scale approach is best understood as the federal courts'
attempt to cope with the tension between the inference and the PSLRA's
particularity requirement.
Tellabs demands that district courts assess scienter holistically.97 In light of
Tellabs, several federal courts have held that whether the fraud concerns a
company's core operations is just one factor considered in the holistic scienter
analysis.98 The Third Circuit in Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc.
implicitly recognized the core operations inference as a factor in that gestalt
analysis. There, the plaintiffs did not provide particularized allegations to show
that the defendant's CEO and CFO knew about substantial price-discounting
practices, but the court still held that the complaint alleged a strong inference of
scienter because price discounting threatened to destabilize the company's
ability to increase sales without cutting prices, which was viewed as key to the
96 705 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949, 968-69 (N.D. Ill. 2010). The district court in Feinberg v.
Benton, No. 05-4847, 2007 WL 4355408 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2007), also implicitly
recognized that the core operations inference alone might be sufficient for a reasonable jury
to find scienter where the subject of the fraud concerned the company's core business. Id. at
*6.
97 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323-24. The Ninth Circuit conducts a two-part inquiry:
[First, the court determines] whether any of the allegations, standing alone, are
sufficient to create a strong inference of scienter; second, if no individual allegation is
sufficient, [the court] conduct[s] a "holistic" review of the same allegations to
determine whether the insufficient allegations combine to create a strong inference of
intentional conduct or deliberate recklessness.
N.M. State Inv. Council v. Ernst & Young LLP, 641 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2011); see
also Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2009). The
Ninth Circuit appears to be alone in this approach. See Frank v. Dana Corp., 646 F.3d 954,
961 (6th Cir. 2011); Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 775 (2d Cir. 2010).
98 See, e.g., Sharenow v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 385 F. App'x 714, 717 (9th Cir.
2010) (nonprecedential disposition); Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d
242, 268-70 (3d Cir. 2009); S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir.
2008); Warchol v. Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-227, 2012 WL
256099, at *11 (D. Vt. Jan. 27, 2012); In re Nvidia Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 08-CV-04260-RS,
2010 WL 4117561, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2010); In re Taleo Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C
09-00151 JSW, 2010 WL 597987, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2010); Kelley v. Rambus, Inc.,
No. C 07-1238 JF (HRL), 2008 WL 5170598, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008).
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company's success. 99 The Ninth Circuit, in South Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger,
made explicit what was implicit in Avaya, and said that the core operations
inference is one factor in a holistic analysis, but then continued to restrict the
inference in a sliding-scale test in order to reconcile the inference with the
particularity requirement.' 00 Under this sliding-scale approach, the more
material the fact is to the company, the less the need for particularized
allegations concerning senior-level management's actual knowledge, and vice
versa. As these next parts show, several federal courts have employed this
sliding scale, many without so stating.
A. The More Significant the Fact Is to the Company, the More Indicative
of Scienter and the Less the Need for Particularized Allegations
The PSLRA's particularity requirement often stands in the way of the core
operations inference. Several federal courts have cursorily stated that the fact
that a misleading statement relates to the company's core operations standing
alone is insufficient to support a strong inference of scienter because of the lack
of particularized allegations.10 1 But this is not always true. In fact, several other
cases have overlooked the lack of particularized allegations when misleading
statements concerned core operations-facts of which senior management must
or should have been aware. 10 2
One of the better examples of softening the particularity requirement in the
face of misstatements about facts so material to the company is Berson v.
Applied Signal Technology, Inc. 10 3 In that case, the plaintiffs sued Applied
Signal Technology and two of its officers, claiming that the defendants misled
investors into thinking that the company was likely to perform work when in
reality it was not.'0 4 The company's customers were almost all agencies of the
federal government; two civilian agencies accounted for 80% of the company's
revenue, and military agencies accounted for the rest.10 5 These government
99 Institutional Investors Grp., 564 F.3d at 268-70.
100542 F.3d at 784; see also Sharenow, 385 F. App'x at 717.
101 See, e.g., Glaser v. The9, Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 2d 573, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Plumbers
Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Ambassador's Grp., 717 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1179 (E.D.
Wash. 2010).
102 See, e.g., Stratte-McClure v. Stanley, 784 F. Supp. 2d 373, 389-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
In re Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 310, 322-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
Plumbers Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 1179; Freudenberg v.
E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 199-201 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Jones v. Corus
Bankshares, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1028-29 (N.D. I11. 2010); Desai v. Gen. Growth
Props., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 836, 860 (N.D. I11. 2009); Silverman v. Motorola, Inc., No. 07
C 4507, 2008 WL 4360648, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2008); In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig.,
584 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1249-50 (N.D. Cal. 2008); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Sec. Litig.,
291 F. Supp. 2d 722, 727 (N.D. 111. 2003).
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customers could, at any time, order the company to stop working on existing
contacts through a "stop-work order."' 10 6 If the government issued a stop-work
order, then the company immediately ceased to earn money; the company only
got paid for work it actually performed, and stopped work often was eventually
cancelled altogether. The government issued four stop-work orders-which
halted tens of millions of dollars of work that the company contracted to do-
but the company continued to count the stopped work as part of its "backlog," a
term the company defined as "the dollar value, of the work it has contracted to
do but hasn't yet performed." 107
The plaintiffs alleged that the company's two officers must have been
aware of the stop-work orders, yet counted the stopped work as part of its
backlog anyway. The plaintiffs did not have any "particular facts indicating that
[the executives] actually knew about the stop-work orders."'1 8 Instead, the
Ninth Circuit said, "[P]laintiffs infer that these high-level managers must have
known about the orders because of their devastating effect on the corporation's
revenue." 109 And the stop-work orders' effect was devastating: the first stop-
work order halted between $10 million and $15 million of work; the second
halted $8 million of work, and the third caused the company to reassign fifty to
seventy-five employees, with the result that one of the company's facilities
became a "ghost town."'1 10 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs adequately
alleged a strong inference of scienter because (1) the executives "were directly
responsible for Applied Signal's day-to-day operations"; and (2) "it is hard to
believe that they would not have known about stop-work orders that allegedly
halted tens'of millions of dollars of the company's work.""'I I
It is important to note, though, that the Ninth Circuit had more to go on to
find scienter than just the materiality of the facts to the company, but not much
(as is often the case). 112 In addition to the core operations inference, the court
also relied on the fact that one of the misleading statements was close in time to
the disclosure of the fraud and that a confidential witness claimed that
management unsuccessfully tried to negotiate away some requirements of the
work contracts to stave off their cancellation. 1 3 These additional facts, though,
would not have made the plaintiffs' case a slam dunk. While the temporal
106Id.
107 Id.
10 8Id. at 987.
10 9 Berson, 527 F.3d at 987 (emphasis omitted).
'
1 0 1d. at 988 n.5.
'IId. at 988.
112 For examples of cases in which the court infers scienter based primarily on the core
operations inference but also other weaker circumstantial evidence, see Sgalambo v.
McKenzie, 739 F. Supp. 2d 453, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), In re RAIT Financial Trust Securities
Litigation, No. 2:07-cv-03148-LDD, 2008 WL 5378164, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2008), In
re Huffy Corp. Securities Litigation, 577 F. Supp. 2d 968, 999-1000 (S.D. Ohio 2008), and
City of Sterling Heights Police & Fire Retirement System v. Abbey National, PLC, 423 F.
Supp. 2d 348, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
113Berson, 527 F.3d at 988.
[Vol. 73:3
INFERRING SCIENTER FROM CORE OPERATIONS
proximity of a misstatement to the revelation of the truth is no doubt suggestive
of scienter, courts are reluctant to infer scienter on temporal proximity alone." 14
And the Ninth Circuit has been most stringent when reviewing allegations from
confidential witnesses. 115 Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Berson returned to the fact
that the matter was "prominent enough that it would be 'absurd to suggest' that
top management was unaware of [it]" as a basis for ultimately inferring
scienter. 116
Another leading example that illustrates the particularity requirement giving
way to a strong inference of scienter is Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs
Inc. (Tellabs 1]).117 That case was one of "classic fraud," as the plaintiffs put
it. 118 In Tellabs II, the company, a manufacturer of fiber optic cable networks,
and its CEO announced that the replacement for the company's flagship product
was "available now," and that a telephone company signed a $100 million
contract to buy this new product. 119 The company and its CEO also repeatedly
touted the growth of the original as well as the replacement product. 120 Yet
from the start, the company was flooding customers with tens of millions of
dollars worth of the original product that customers did not order to create the
illusion of demand ("channel stuffing"). The company even leased extra storage
space to house the large number of returns. 121 Eventually, the company
announced a major drop in revenue, and the company's largest customer cut its
product order in half. During the class period, not a single unit of the
replacement product was shipped.122
How likely was it that the allegedly false statements concerning the
company's products were the result of careless mistakes rather than an intent to
deceive or a reckless indifference to whether the statements were misleading?
Even in the absence of particularized allegations of the CEO's actual
ll4See, e.g., Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 930 (8th Cir. 2008); Fidel v. Farley, 392
F.3d 220, 232 (6th Cir. 2004).
15lSee, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 985, 988 (9th Cir.
1999).
ll 6 Berson, 527 F.3d at 989. The court's reliance on No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint
Council Pension Trust Fund v. America West Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003),
bolsters this conclusion. In America West, the court inferred that outside directors must have
been aware of the company's maintenance problems and a government investigation because
it would have been absurd to suggest the board wasn't discussing these problems. There
were no particularized allegations of knowledge in that case either. Id. at 942-43.
117513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008).
118 Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Tellabs 11, 513 F.3d 702 (No. 04-1687).
119 Tellabs 11, 513 F.3d at 706.
12 0 Id.
121 Id. This is generally known as "channel stuffing," a practice where a company ships
more of one's product than one thinks a distributor can sell. Sometimes this is used to incite
sales, but when it is used to book revenues on the basis of goods shipped but not really sold,
then it becomes a form of fraud. Id. at 709.
1221d. at 707.
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knowledge, according to the Seventh Circuit, it was "exceedingly unlikely."'123
The court explained that the products were the company's "most important
products"; it was as if "General Motors announced that it had sold one million
SUVs in 2006, and the actual number was zero." 124 The plaintiffs did not offer
particularized facts that the company's CEO knew about the declining demand,
and yet the court held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that the company's
executives acted with scienter "since so dramatic an announcement would have
been approved by corporate officials sufficiently knowledgeable about the
company to know that the announcement was false."' 125
Similar to Berson, the Seventh Circuit in Tellabs II had more than just
misleading statements from senior management about the company's core
products to infer scienter, although also like Berson these additional allegations
do not seem to represent the tipping point in inferring scienter. For example, the
court relied upon the fact that the company paid$100,000 to a consulting
company to forecast demand for its products, which showed the market was
evaporating, and that twenty-six confidential sources would confirm these
allegations.12 6 But the Seventh Circuit in Higginbotham v. Baxter International,
Inc., also said that "[o]ne upshot of the approach that Tellabs announced is that
we must discount allegations that the complaint attributes to... 'confidential
witnesses"' and "[u]sually that discount will be steep."'127
The court also relied on the facts that the defendants engaged in channel
stuffing, that the company leased a warehouse to store the huge number of
returns, and that the company's largest customer even called to complain about
products shipped that were not ordered. 128 But the court's analysis really just
looped back to the core operations inference. Channel stuffing can be either
legitimate (i.e., prodding distributors to move more product) or illegitimate (i.e.,
a way to hide dwindling demand for a product). 129 The court thought that the
channel stuffing in this case suggested scienter, however, for two reasons. First,
channel stuffing was used to "book revenues on the basis of goods shipped but
not really sold because the buyer can return them," making them "in effect sales
on consignment, and such sales 'cannot be booked as revenue.' 130 Second, the
123 Id. at 709.
124Id. at 709-10. Indeed, in the company's annual report, the CEO acknowledged that
the company's "core business is built on" the products that were the subject of the fraud.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc. (Tellabs 1), 437 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2006).
125 Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 710.
1261d. at 709-12.
127495 F.3d 753, 756-57 (7th Cir. 2007).
128 Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 709-10.
129See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 325 (2007);
Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 709 ("A certain amount of channel stuffing could be innocent and
might not even mislead-a seller might have a realistic hope that stuffing the channel of
distribution would incite his distributors to more vigorous efforts to sell the stuff lest it pile
up in inventory."); Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261-62 (1 1th Cir. 2006);
Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 202-03 (1st Cir. 1999).
130 Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 709.
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court reasoned that because the number of returns was so significant (i.e.,
material to the company), senior management must have been aware of it:
The huge number of returns of [the original product] is evidence that the
purpose of the stuffing was to conceal the disappointing demand for the
product rather than to prod distributors to work harder to attract new
customers, and the purpose would have been formed or ratified at the highest
level of management. 131
More often, though, the core operations inference supplements already
particularized allegations of the defendant's state of mind.132 In In re
Countrywide Financial Corp. Securities Litigation, the court used the core
operations inference to bolster a strong inference of scienter in fraud claims
against a prominent real estate company, Countrywide. 133 The plaintiffs alleged
that the company relaxed its lending standards to approve more loans to high-
risk borrowers while the company's "officers publicly denied that underwriting
standards had deteriorated."'1 34 The court used the core operations inference to
strongly infer that Countrywide's chief operating officer (COO), who publicly
denied that the company lowered lending standards, acted with scienter.
Additionally, the plaintiffs had particularized allegations that the COO sat in
numerous review and strategy committee meetings relating to the company's
131d. at 710.
132 See, e.g., New Orleans Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Celestica, Inc., No. 10-4702-cv, 2011 WL
6823204, at *2 n.3 (2d Cir. Dec. 29, 2011) (collecting cases and stating that "Both
parties... agree that allegations of a company's core operations... can provide
supplemental support for allegations of scienter, even if they cannot establish scienter
independently. That view finds support in decisions by this court and district courts within
this circuit." (later citing cases)); In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1022-23 (9th Cir.
2005); Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp., 380 F.3d 1226, 1231 (9th
Cir. 2004); Centaur Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund Ltd. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 793
F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2011); S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 687 F. Supp. 2d
1248, 1260-62 (W.D. Wash. 2009). A recent case illustrates how the core operations
inference bolsters existing allegations quite well. In In re Toyota Motor Corp. Securities
Litigation, No. CV10-922 DSF, 2011 WL 2675395 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2011), the plaintiffs
alleged that the company and its executives made misleading statements about unintended
acceleration problems with the company's cars. Id. at *4. The plaintiffs offered an email
from a vice president in which he admitted that the cars were having mechanical problems
that resulted in unintended acceleration. Id. at *3. The district court concluded that the
plaintiffs adequately alleged scienter because of this admission and also went on to conclude
that the core operations inference would have established scienter. Id. at *3-4. According to
the court, the defects were "too significant for it to be plausible that top Toyota management
was not aware of the possible ramifications of the problem," because "[t]he magnitude of the
problem was overwhelming, both in its potential catastrophic results and the number of
vehicles involved," "[t]he likely cost was extraordinary; the resultant financial impact was
admittedly significant; and the regulatory scrutiny was intense." Id. at *4.
133 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
134Id. at 1146.
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lending practices, and had access to numerous detailed reports. 135 All this
evidence, combined with his position as COO, established a strong inference of
scienter. 136 The court said that the "alleged underwriting quality and credit risk
management issues were so fundamental to Countrywide, and on such a broad
scale, [it] should have been so apparent that 'it would be difficult to conclude
that those Defendants at the top levels of Countrywide management did not
know what was going on."I' 1 37 Countrywide may not be a typical case; the court
explained that Countrywide presented an "extraordinary case where a
company's essential operations were so at odds with the company's public
statements." 138 And the other courts to address lob-5 suits in the context of the
financial crisis and the subprime meltdown are generally reluctant to infer
scienter. 139
Nonetheless, these cases show that plaintiffs may establish a strong
inference of scienter through the core operations inference alone or at least
primarily without particularized allegations. This is no easy task; in just
pleadings, plaintiffs must convince a court that the matter is so material that
senior management must have been aware of it. Many federal district courts
deal with the core operations inference simply by deeming the subject
something that, although material, is not material enough such that senior
management must have been aware of it. 140 This pushes the case to the other
end of the spectrum where the court deems the facts less significant and thus
less indicative of scienter and, therefore, in need of particularized allegations.
131Id. at 1194.
1361d
137Id. (emphasis added) (quoting In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 554 F.
Supp. 2d 1044, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2008)).
138Id. at 1144.
139See generally Kevin LaCroix, The List: Subprime Lawsuit Dismissals and Denials,
D&O DIARY (June 10, 2008, 5:27 PM), http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/06/articles/
subprime-litigation/the-list-subprime-lawsuit-dismissals-and-denials/index.html (listing
subprime and credit crisis-related suits and dispositions).
14 0 See Brecher v. Citigroup Inc., 797 F. Supp. 2d 354, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re
Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 360-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Brown v. Moll,
No. C 09-05881 SI, 2010 WL 4704372, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010); In re Bare
Escentuals, Inc. Sec. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1077-78 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Plumbers &
Pipefitters Local Union No. 630 Pension-Annuity Trust Fund v. Arbitron Inc., 741 F. Supp.
2d 474, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Accuray, Inc. Sec. Litig., 757 F. Supp. 2d 936, 951 (N.D.
Cal. 2010); In re Constellation Energy Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 738 F. Supp. 2d 614, 635 (D.
Md. 2010); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union 719 Pension Fund v. Zimmer Holdings,
Inc., 673 F. Supp. 2d 718, 746-47 (S.D. Ind. 2009); In re Cadence Design Sys., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 654 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2009); City of Westland Police & Fire Ret.
Sys. v. Sonic Solutions, No. C 07-05111 CW, 2009 WL 942182, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6,
2009); Medis Investor Grp. v. Medis Techs., Ltd., 586 F. Supp. 2d 136, 146-47 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (rejecting plaintiff's allegation because the court could not discern whether executive
was senior-level); In re eSpeed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 266, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
In re JP Morgan Chase Sec. Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 595, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Copper
Mountain Sec. Litig., 311 F. Supp. 2d 857, 872 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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B. The Less Significant the Fact Is to the Company, the Less Indicative of
Scienter and the More the Need for Particularized Allegations
On the other end of the spectrum lie cases in which the courts insist on
particularized allegations because the facts were not so material such that
executives should have been aware of them. Courts push cases to this end of the
spectrum by either requiring particularized allegations to bolster existing
allegations that management was exposed to the facts that are the subject of the
fraud, 14 1 or by explicitly rejecting the doctrine as an end-run around the
PSLRA's particularity requirement that plaintiffs allege facts with
particularity. 142 These courts appear to require particularized allegations to
nudge the inference of scienter so that it is stronger than the nonculpable
inference that senior management was unaware of those facts. 1
43
141 See S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 785 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Daou
Sys. Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005); PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d
671, 688 (6th Cir. 2004); Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 867 (5th Cir. 2003);
see also In re Constellation Energy Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 738 F. Supp. 2d at 635-36; In re
Huntington Bancshares Inc. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 2d 951, 970-71 (S.D. Ohio 2009);
Waterford Twp. Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. CompuCredit Corp., No. 1:08-CV-2270-TWT,
2009 WL 4730315, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 4, 2009); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union, 673
F. Supp. 2d at 746-47.
14 2 See In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 352-53 (collecting cases
and discussing viability of the approach in the Second Circuit); Latham v. Matthews, 662 F.
Supp. 2d 441, 467-68 (D.S.C. 2009); In re Take-Two Interactive Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp.
2d 247, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (refusing to find scienter based upon core operations inference
because complaint lacked particularized allegations that management had access to
information establishing falsity). But see Stevens v. InPhonic, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 105, 121
n.8 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting the core operations inference).143 See In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 360-61 (requiring
particularized allegations to support core operations theory suggesting executives knew of
operational details to meet the Tellabs standard).
The Eighth Circuit has said that even if an allegation concerns the core operation of a
company, the plaintiff must at a minimum allege facts that lay a foundation for an inference
that the facts were known within the company. Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 929-30 (8th
Cir. 2008). The Eighth Circuit claims to have reserved judgment on the viability of the core
operations inference, but a closer read of Elam suggests that the court has actually adopted
the position that particularized allegations are required to bolster the inference of knowledge
for executives. See also Cornelia I. Crowell GST Trust v. Possis Med., Inc., 519 F.3d 778,
783 (8th Cir. 2008) (The court rejected the argument that the "overarching importance" of a
clinical study, which was "vital to the company's future" and that contradicted alleged
statements by the company, supported an inference that senior management was "aware of
its negative results" because the study was conducted independent of the company "at
several off-site locations," and plaintiffs did not allege facts relating "to the executives'
involvement in either its design or ongoing administration.").
On the other hand, however, in Detroit General Retirement System v. Medtronic, Inc.,
621 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2010), the court implied that it would attribute scienter in "a situation
where the falsity was so obvious that anyone familiar with the business of the company
would have known the statements to be false at the time they were made." Id. at 808.
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Routine operations that do not significantly influence the bottom line or
fringe operations that are not under management's control are facts that the
courts usually consider as not material enough to invoke the core operations
inference. For example, allegations that senior management is aware of slight
nuances in the company's daily operations usually require particularized
allegations of knowledge. 144 Also, in Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp.,
the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had to come forward with particularized
allegations that executives were aware of or had access to information that
suggested that certain statements were misleading where those statements
concerned highly technical terms relating to the development process and
accounting definitions. 145 The court required particularized allegations because
the misleading statements did not relate to "especially prominent facts," and the
misrepresentations were "largely definitional [and] the falsity of the original
representations would not be immediately obvious to corporate
management."' 146 Similarly, in Glazer Capital Management, LP v. Magistri,
where the alleged fraud concerned a discrete set of illegal payments by the
company's foreign sales agents, the court refused to infer scienter without
particularized allegations regarding the company's senior management's
knowledge of the payments. 147
V. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CORE OPERATIONS INFERENCE
The core operations inference recognizes that those in a position to know
facts material to the company's core operations and its investors likely act with
scienter when they make public misstatements. As explained below, the
Supreme Court has provided implicit support for the core operations inference.
First, those defendants encompassed by the core operations inference remain
culpable actors even after the Court's most recent attempts to restrict the scope
of liability under Rule lOb-5. Second, the Court said that scienter may be
inferred when a defendant who is in a position to know about a statement's
falsity makes a statement about a fact that the defendant should know would be
material to investors. Third, the Court recognized that the lack of particularized
allegations alone does not defeat a strong inference of scienter.
144See, e.g., S. Ferry LP, No. 2, 542 F.3d at 784; Lapiner v. Camtek, Ltd., No. C 08-
01327 MMC, 2011 WL 445849, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2011); In re Nvidia Corp. Sec.
Litig., No. 08-CV-04260-RS, 2010 WL 4117561, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2010); In re
Accuray, Inc. Sec. Litig., 757 F. Supp. 2d 936, 951 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
145 552 F.3d 981, 1001 (9th Cir. 2009).
1461Id
147 549 F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 2008); cf Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d
125, 130 (Del. 1963) ("[A]bsent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to
install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have
no reason to suspect exists.").
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A. Senior Management as Culpable Actors
Even in light of the Supreme Court rejecting the expansion of remedies
afforded to investors for securities fraud and limiting defendants' exposure to
securities fraud liability, the core operations inference still fits comfortably
within the Court's precedent. The Court's most recent attempts to confine the
1Ob-5 private right of action-Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative
Traders148 and Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc. 149-illustrate this point. 150
First, in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the
Supreme Court addressed the scope of scheme liability under Rule lOb-5.1
51
The Court held that only those upon whom investors rely may be liable under
the securities laws.' 52 Even reading Stoneridge most narrowly, the defendants
that fall under the core operations inference also fall within the zone of
defendants who can be held liable after Stoneridge. Unquestionably, senior
management is aware that the public statements they make will have an effect
on the market price and are in fact designed to do so.'
53
Similarly, even under the Supreme Court's most recent restriction of
liability under Rule lOb-5 in Janus,154 the defendants that fall under the core
operations inference are still culpable actors. In Janus, the Court held that only
"the maker of a statement" may be liable under Rule 1 Ob-5, and that a maker "is
148 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
149 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
150 Both cases were private actions. Stoneridge does not influence the scope of liability
in government actions, but whether Janus does is an open question.
151 552 U.S. at 152.
152 Id. at 160-67.
153 Professor Donald C. Langevoort offers a nuanced interpretation of Stoneridge,
saying that although facially the decision purports to address reliance, Stoneridge is about
duty:
[Slaying that only certain kinds of actors and conduct ought to be subjected to the
extraordinary risk of a fraud-on-the-market lawsuit-i.e., that the enforceable duty of
candor owed specifically to all investors in the capital marketplace should be limited
and should not attach to 'the whole marketplace in which the issuing company does
business' unless the actors can fairly be said to owe a cognizable duty to the
marketplace.
Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to Reliance
and Third Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 2125, 2137 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Professor Langevoort thus derives five duty-based rules for third
parties, many of which focus on either those who owe a fiduciary duty to investors or those
who are or should be cognizant of the effect of market fraud. Id. at 2154-55. We express no
view about these rules for liability for third parties or the core operations inference's
application in that context. We briefly note, however, that the core operations inference
might prove useful if, for example, an accountant lies about accounting practices, which is
the accountant's core operation.
154 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
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the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its
content and whether and how to communicate it."155 Senior management are
"makers" of public misstatements concerning core operations. The Court
emphasized that those with "control" over the content and dissemination of
public statements fall within the purview of Rule lOb-5,156 and the board of
directors (or senior management under the core operations inference) is
typically the entity that is charged with "ultimate authority" over the
business.' 57 Moreover, some federal courts recognized before Janus that an
officer who signs an SEC filing "makes" a statement under Section 10(b) and
Rule 1 Ob-5.1 58 Janus also focused on the person or entity with control over the
statement that ultimately makes its way into the market, reinforcing the idea that
those who understand the severity of misleading information in the marketplace
likewise should be subject to liability.
B. Materiality as a Basis to Infer Scienter
Materiality is the crux of the core operations inference, and the Supreme
Court's decisions in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds 59 and Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano160 provide more specific support for the core operations inference.
In Merck and Matrixx, the Court recognized that scienter may be inferred if a
defendant who is in a certain position acts recklessly when he makes misleading
statements about facts that he should know are material to investors. 161 This, in
essence, is the core operations inference: we can infer scienter when senior
management makes misleading statements about core operations-facts that are
material to the company and to its investors.
155 1d. at 2302.
15 6 See id.
157 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (stating that the board of directors has
authority over the company).
158 See, e.g., Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000); W. Palm
Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Startek, Inc., No. 05-cv-01265-WDM-MEH, 2008 WL
879023, at *14 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2008); In re Reliance Sec. Litig., 135 F. Supp. 2d 480,
503 (D. Del. 2001). See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, Form over Substance?: Officer
Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (2002). But see, e.g., In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. &
ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 385 (D. Md. 2004) (dismissing Section 10(b) and Rule
1Ob-5 claims against the company's CEO because plaintiffs alleged "very little" other than
the fact that he signed SEC filings).
We note that those who sign false filings with the SEC are likely liable, not only under
Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 as primary violators, but also under Section 18 of the 1934
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2006).
159 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010).
160 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
161Id. at 1324; Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1796.
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In Merck & Co., the Court stated that "certain statements are such that, to
show them false is normally to show scienter as well."'1 62 The Court then
provided an example: "It is unlikely ... that someone would falsely say 'I am
not married' without being aware of the fact that his statement is false."' 163 From
this statement, one may conclude that scienter can be inferred when a defendant
makes misstatements about matters that his position suggests that he should
know.
Likewise, in Matrixx, the Court concluded that executives acted with
scienter when they made false statements concerning its "leading," "core brand"
of product. 164 There, the plaintiffs alleged that a pharmaceutical company and
three of its executives made misleading statements about a cold remedy. 165 The
defendants defended on the basis that, although the statements may have been
misleading, they were not materially so because the defendants did not know of
a statistically significant number of adverse events involving the cold
remedy. 166 The Court rejected this bright-line rule of materiality and concluded
that the misleading statements were material. 167 Once the Court concluded the
facts were material, inferring scienter was easy: the Court assumed recklessness
was sufficient and rejected the defendants' defense that they lacked scienter
because they did not know the facts were material. 168 Although the Court's
actual discussion of scienter is less than informative, implicit in the Court's
conclusion is that the defendant's defense wouldn't fly because, in the Court's
view, the defendants should have known the facts would have been material. In
other words, whether the defendant was correct about the materiality of a fact
was largely irrelevant-executives should have known facts that are material to
investors.
What Merck and Matrixx tell us is that when it comes to inferring scienter,
position and materiality matter. If the defendant is in a position such that he
should know the truth of a statement (if he is married, he should know it), then
on a motion to dismiss we may infer scienter from the gravity of a false
statement alone. In other words, if the defendant makes misleading statements
of facts material to investors as core operations likely will be, then the
defendant is acting recklessly.
162 Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1796.
163Id. at 1797.
164 Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1313-14, 1324-25.
165 Id. at 1314.
166 1d. at 1324.
1671d. at 1322.
16 8 1d. at 1324-25. The Sixth Circuit, discussing Matrixx's analysis of scienter,
observed: "[T]he Court provided for us a post-Tellabs example of how to consider scienter
pleadings holistically in section 10(b) cases. Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor
expertly addressed the allegations collectively, did so quickly, and, importantly, did not
parse out the allegations for individual analysis." Frank v. Dana Corp., 647 F.3d 954, 961
(6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
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C. Subsuming the Particularity Requirement
The particularity requirement often stands in the way of inferring scienter
from misstatements about the company's core operations, but it shouldn't. The
last pillar that supports the core operations inference is the Supreme Court's
containment of the particularity requirement. The core operations inference, by
assuming executives were aware of facts pertaining to the company's core
operations, obviates the need for plaintiffs to provide particularized allegations
that senior management knew of or had access to the facts that were the subject
of the fraud. 169 This Part shows that Tellabs softens the PSLRA's particularity
requirement, saying that whether an allegation is particularized simply factors
into the holistic scienter analysis.
Several federal courts have held that the core operations inference alone is
insufficient to satisfy the pleading standards under the PSLRA because the
plaintiffs have not provided particularized allegations that detail senior
management's actual knowledge.170 Rather, according to these courts, the core
operations inference only bolsters the strength of an inference of scienter when
plaintiffs have already alleged particularized facts indicating that the defendants
knew or might have known their statements were false.'71
For example, in In re Read-Rite Corp., 172 the investors sued a company that
made components for hard-disk drives and the company's CEO and COO,
alleging that the defendants made misstatements regarding the demand of its
products from one of its four largest customers. 173 The Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that although one could reasonably infer that the CEO and COO
were aware of the false statements about demand for the company's products
because of their job duties, a "reasonable inference" does not satisfy the PSLRA
requirement that the plaintiffs plead facts with particularity. 174 The Ninth
Circuit also addressed Epstein v. Itron, Inc.,175 a district court case decided
before the Ninth Circuit interpreted the PSLRA in In re Silicon Graphics Inc.
Securities Litigation.176 In Epstein, the court held that facts critical to a
company's core operations or an important transaction generally are so apparent
169 See, e.g., Stevens v. InPhonic, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 105, 121 n.8 (D.D.C. 2009).
170See, e.g., In re Bally Total Fitness Sec. Litig., No. 04 C 3530, 2006 WL 3714708, at
*9 (N.D. I1. July 12, 2006); see also Gregory A. Markel & Martin L. Seidel, 'Core
Operations'Doctrine May Undermine PSLRA, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 29, 2010, at 5.
171 See, e.g., Glaser v. The9, Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 2d 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Reserve
Fund Sec. & Derivative Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 310, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Glover v.
DeLuca, No. 2:03-CV-0288, 2006 WL 2850448, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2006).
172 In re Read-Rite Corp., 335 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2003).
173 Id. at 844-45.
1741d. at 848-49.
175 993 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D. Wash. 1998). This decision is recognized as the first to refer
to the core operations inference of scienter. Jared L. Kopel & Maulik Shah, The Core
Operations Inference, 44 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 113, 114 n.5 (2011).
176 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.1999).
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that knowledge may be attributed to the company and its key officers. 177 But in
Read-Rite, the court held that this rule was no longer the law as it contravened
the PSLRA, which "plainly requires the plaintiff to plead 'particular facts in the
complaint' that 'raise a "strong inference" that misleading statements were
knowingly or [with] deliberate recklessness made to investors. '"l 78
Not all courts agreed with this approach, however, and many implicitly
recognized that the core operations inference alone is sufficient to overcome the
particularity requirement. 179 For instance, one court highlighted "two common-
sense principles" that endured the PSLRA:
First, the closer a situation is to a business's core operations, the more
reasonable it may be to infer that senior management is aware of the situation.
Second, the more pervasive and widespread a fraudulent scheme is within a
company, the more reasonable it may be to infer that senior executives were
aware of the scheme. 180
But we need not look to only the federal appellate and district courts. The
Supreme Court in Tellabs provided considerable-and somewhat neglected-
guidance on this question. In Tellabs, the Court lessened the force of the
particularity requirement to just one factor to evaluate in a holistic assessment.
For example, the majority in Tellabs stated that "omissions and ambiguities
count against inferring scienter, for plaintiffs must 'state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind.""181 But, the Court continued, this was just one aspect to take into
account in the district judge's collective assessment of the complaint. 182 The
majority's opinion cannot be read as holding that vague allegations do not enter
the scienter assessment altogether. Indeed, this was the very point of Justice
Alito's concurrence, where the Justice argued that allegations that did not meet
the particularity requirement should not enter the scienter analysis at all. 183
177 Epstein, 993 F. Supp. at 1326.
1781n re Read-Rite Corp., 335 F.3d at 848 (quoting Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d, 423,
429 (9th Cir. 2001)).
179 See, e.g., Crowell v. Ionics, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D. Mass. 2004); In re Sears,
Roebuck & Co. Sec. Litig., 291 F. Supp. 2d 722, 727 (N.D. Ill. 2003); In re Ramp Networks,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2002); In re Xerox Corp. Sec. Litig.,
165 F. Supp. 2d 208, 223 (D. Conn. 2001).
180 City of Austin Police Ret. Sys. v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 932, 949
(S.D. Ind. 2005) (citation omitted).
181 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326 (2007) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006)).
1821d. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit has said that Tellabs did not alter the particularity
requirement, but then the court has gone on to note that the particularity requirement is now
incorporated into a holistic assessment of the facts of the complaint. Zucco Partners, LLC v.
Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2009).
183 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 334 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that the majority's approach
"contradict[s] the clear statutory language,"... "undermines the particularity requirement's
purpose of preventing a plaintiff from using vague or general allegations in order to get by a
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What Tellabs means for the core operations inference is that the vagueness
surrounding precisely how senior management knew about the facts pertaining
to the misleading statements is simply one factor to consider in the scienter
analysis. This is similar to how courts should treat allegations from confidential
witnesses: that the allegation comes from an unnamed source may weigh
against scienter, but it does not require a steep discount of the allegation solely
because of this ambiguity. 184 Under Tellabs's construct, the particularity of an
allegation may suggest a higher probability that the defendant acted with
scienter, but the lack of particularity does not negate a strong inference of
scienter altogether.
VI. CONCLUSION
Inferring state of mind from mental markers is a messy endeavor. But where
senior management makes misleading statements regarding matters within their
company's core operations, one can strongly infer that the defendant acted with
scienter as defined by the securities laws. This core operations inference of
scienter plays an important role in private securities fraud litigation, though it is
often downplayed as too conclusory. Properly understood, however, the inference
is grounded in common sense, the securities laws, and Supreme Court
jurisprudence. The inference enables plaintiffs to satisfy the PSLRA's heightened
pleading burden and it promotes recovery for injured investors.
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim," and "[strips] [t]he particularity
requirement ... of all meaning").184 See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Congress, the Supreme Court and
the Proper Role of Confidential Informants in Securities Fraud Litigation, 36 SEC. REG. L.J.
345, 352 (2008); Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36 J. CORP.
L. 551, 569-604 (2011); see also S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir.
2008) ("In Tellabs, the Court explained that 'omissions and ambiguities count against
inferring scienter,' but held that they were still properly considered."). But see
Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (steeply discounting
allegations from confidential witnesses).
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